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Abstract Strengthening civil society through the provision of financial 
resources and technical assistance is viewed by aid donors as an effective 
means of fostering political pluralism and consolidating fragile democracies 
in developing countries. Starting from the premise that donors lack a 
well‐defined notion of civil society which obscures its conflictual nature, 
this article considers a range of potential problems that aid donors might 
encounter in relation to the process of democratic consolidation when 
supporting civil society organizations. It argues that since donors are not 
well‐equipped to handle these types of interventions, they need to avoid 
undermining the autonomy and legitimacy of recipient organizations: 
their absorptive capacity is limited, only certain types of organization 
are able to contribute effectively to democracy promotion, and little is 
known about their impact. The objective of strengthening civil society may 
be laudable but since it is a difficult and potentially hazardous area for 
external intervention, donors should proceed cautiously and with modest 
expectations about what might be achieved.
Strengthening civil society constitutes an increasingly important element 
in the array of  positive aid measures adopted by aid donors as part of  the 
good government agenda. Although donors have long supported civic 
associations, often through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
volume of  aid allocated for this purpose has generally been small and it 
has been peripheral to the main aid policy agenda. The article begins 
by exploring the rationale behind this shift in emphasis, highlighting the 
interplay of  domestic and international factors. It then surveys the range 
of  meanings attributed to the concept in academic debate and the role 
of  civil society in the process of  democratic consolidation. The nature of  
the relationship between civil society and the state in Africa provides a 
basis for assessing the role of  foreign aid and its potential impact on the 
internal dynamics of  civic associations and their capacity to contribute 
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to political pluralism and democratic consolidation. The conclusion 
considers the benefits and limitations of  this type of  aid in strengthening 
civil society and the types of  interventions and funding mechanisms that 
hold most promise in this regard.
1 THE RESURGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The 1990s have seen a major upsurge of  interest in the concept of  civil 
society and its relevance to understanding democratic transition and 
consolidation in the developing world. Although the civic realm was 
acknowledged to be an important locus of  organizational activity, few 
commentators gave the concept serious attention in view of  a general 
preoccupation with the role of  the state and authoritarian forms of  
government which prevailed in most developing countries. A number of  
factors help to explain a marked revival of  interest in a concept that had 
received limited attention in scholarly and aid policy circles, especially 
in Africa.1 
The experience of  democratization in most regions of  the developing 
world starting from the early 1980s was a major factor in shifting 
academic concerns from the state to societal institutions. It brought 
with it an interest in the capacity of  civic organizations and new social 
movements to play an active role in undermining authoritarian rule 
and contributing to the process of  democratic consolidation. This was 
especially important in Eastern Europe where the all-pervasive state 
had circumscribed an autonomous sphere of  associational life, but in 
which civil society provided the well-spring for the successful democracy 
movements of  the late 1980s, and a source of  inspiration for democracy 
movements elsewhere in the developing world.
A second explanation stems from economic factors which have political 
implications. Sustained economic decline and mismanagement in 
much of  Africa in the 1980s under the aegis of  statist regimes was often 
accompanied by disengagement from the formal economy, marked by 
the withdrawal of  the peasantry from the market back into subsistence 
production, outward migration and the spread of  the parallel economy 
characterized by hoarding, currency exchange, smuggling and other 
illegal activities. This process of  disengagement further undermined the 
legitimacy of  the state and weakened its links with societal institutions 
(Chazan 1988). In some contexts, such as Zambia, Côte D’Ivoire and 
Benin, the weakening of  the state’s legitimacy and its control over 
society gave succour to pro-democracy movements, whereas in countries 
such as Liberia and Somalia it gave rise to destructive tendencies 
promoted by ethnic and regional interests competing for political power 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1992). 
Third, the trend towards privatization and the rolling back of  the state 
as an integral element of  donor aid policy has focused attention on 
the scope for the provision of  public services through private sector 
organizations. In Africa, this has invariably centred the capacity of  the 
voluntary sector and local self-help organizations to contribute towards 
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health and educational provision given the unevenness of  formal sector 
provision, which has further shifted the balance of  power and social 
responsibility away from the state in favour of  societal institutions. This 
is reinforced by expectations on the part of  aid donors that NGOs in 
particular will play an increasingly significant role in service delivery 
and poverty alleviation programmes.
Fourth, problems encountered in the application of  political 
conditionality as a means of  fostering political reform and good 
government have focused donor attention on the potential for 
promoting these objectives through positive aid measures (Moore and 
Robinson 1994). This has included channelling aid to civic associations 
and organized interest groups with a view to enhancing democratic 
consolidation and political participation. The success of  these types of  
initiatives in Chile and South Africa has increased donors’ confidence in 
their potential elsewhere. Recipients of  such assistance typically include 
NGOs, business and professional associations (principally lawyers and 
journalists), trade unions, womens’ organizations, and human rights 
groups. All of  these are deemed as constituting key organizations in civil 
society, but there is little agreement about what is conveyed by the term 
or the objectives of  directing aid to such organizations.
2 CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
There are many competing interpretations of  civil society, which have 
their origins in various currents of  western political philosophy.2 In 
the liberal tradition, civil society is defined as a public realm located 
between the family and the state, consisting of  a plurality of  civil 
associations. The formation of  such associations by citizens of  their 
own volition can counteract the potential abuse of  power and wealth. 
They also function to nurture civil and political rights, to advocate 
popular demands and to promote democratic values. These ideas were 
challenged by theorists such as Hegel and Marx who espoused an 
historicist approach, in which civil society is seen as the product of  a 
long process of  historical transformation governed by the emergence 
of  a sphere of  market relations under capitalism. This notion was 
developed further by Antonio Gramsci, who treated civil society as an 
inherently conflictual arena, where civic institutions reproduce and 
disseminate the hegemonic ideas and values associated with capitalism, 
but which are subject to contestation. 
Clearly these two traditions are associated with very different 
interpretations of  civil society, which have significant operational 
implications, since most aid donors are inclined towards the liberal 
interpretation. However, some writers have discerned a degree of  
convergence between the two traditions centring on the claim that civil 
society is a distinct public realm located between the family and the state, 
where individuals join together to pursue collective goals (Bratton 1994: 
55-6). Civil society therefore includes a wide array of  organizations which 
have a range of  objectives stemming from the shared interests of  their 
members. According to Stepan (1988), it is distinct from political society, 
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which includes political parties, legislatures and elections, through which 
organized interests enter into coalitions and compete for political power. 
Diamond (1994) has classified civil society organizations into seven 
categories depending on their goals and membership: (1) economic 
(productive and commercial associations and networks); (2) cultural 
(religious, communal and ethnic associations); (3) informational and 
educational (organizations dedicated to the production and circulation 
of  ideas and information); (4) interest-based (designed to advance the 
interests of  workers, professionals, etc.); (5) developmental (NGOs and 
self-help groups); (6) issue-oriented (movements for environmental 
protection, womens’ rights, etc.) and (7) civic (aimed at strengthening 
the political system and imparting democratic values). According to 
Diamond civil society also encompasses the mass media and other 
institutions which contribute to the flow of  information and ideas 
(such as universities, publishing houses etc.) but which do not represent 
associations formed by organized interests. Such a typology resonates 
with the pluralist approach favoured by most aid donors who conceive 
civil society as an aggregation of  organized interests pursuing a benign 
and rational political agenda. For example, according to the UNDP:
Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become 
organized. The organizations of  civil society, which represent 
many diverse and sometimes contradictory social interests are 
shaped to fit their social base, constituency, thematic orientations 
(e.g. environment, gender, human rights) and types of  activity. They 
include church related groups, trade unions, cooperatives, service 
organizations, community groups and youth organizations, as well as 
academic institutions and others 
(Riddell and Bebbington 1995: 23).
For many commentators, the concept only attains practical significance 
when considered in relation to the state, and more specifically, the 
process of  democratization. As indicated in the previous section, civil 
society emerged into popular discourse in the late 1980s by virtue of  
the prominent role played by civic associations in democratic transitions 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe, especially by those representing 
the working class, professionals, students and new social movements 
which, in many instances, joined forces into a ‘popular upsurge’ against 
incumbent authoritarian regimes (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). 
The pivotal role played by mass protest in political transition in Africa 
has also received attention. According to Bratton (1994), three broad, 
primarily urban-based, groups have been important in the African 
context: the popular classes of  self-employed peasants, artizans and 
vendors; the unionized working class; and the middle classes consisting 
of  entrepreneurs, administrators and professionals. Prompted by a 
combination of  economic malaise and political atrophy, these strata 
joined forces to challenge the authority and legitimacy of  authoritarian 
regimes across the continent, in many cases giving rise to a process of  
democratic transition. This process was generally short-lived, culminating 
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in multi-party elections or in the installation of  a caretaker government 
to negotiate the form of  a successor regime. At this point, the institutions 
of  political society assumed a more prominent role in completing the 
transition from authoritarian rule, centred on political parties competing 
for power through elections. Having achieved their political objective, 
civic organizations, especially those representing professionals and the 
middle class, assumed a more neutral role, taking on responsibility for 
voter registration, election monitoring and human rights work. 
Now that this phase is largely complete, interest is increasingly focusing 
on the role played by civil society in democratic consolidation, defined 
as the process whereby democracy attains widespread acceptance as the 
preferred system for the conduct of  political affairs, since this has yet to 
be achieved in most African countries which have undergone a political 
transition. According to Diamond (1994: 7): 
Civil society is … a vital instrument for containing the power of  
democratic governments, checking their potential abuses and 
violations of  the law, and subjecting them to public scrutiny. Indeed, 
a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and 
maintaining democracy than for initiating it.
This type of  approach finds resonance among bilateral aid agencies. 
According a recent paper published by the Development Assistance 
Committee of  the OECD (1994: 11).
[B]asic to democratization is the development of  a pluralist civil 
society comprised of  a range of  institutions and associations 
which represent diverse interests and provide a counterweight 
to government. Interaction between the formal political regime 
and civil society contributes to, and also requires, a responsive 
government, which is one of  the characteristics of  a functioning 
democracy. Supporting pluralism, e.g. the development of  
autonomous civil associations, professional and interest organizations, 
is an important step in fostering democratization.
White (1994) argues that the growth of  civil society can contribute 
to democratic governance in four complementary ways: altering the 
balance of  power between state and society to achieve a balanced 
opposition in favour of  the latter; enforcing standards of  public morality 
and performance and improving the accountability of  politicians and 
state officials; transmitting the demands and articulating the interests 
of  organized groups, in the process providing an alternative sphere 
of  representation; and instilling and upholding democratic values. 
However, as White points out, while civil society holds real potential 
to influence the process of  democratic consolidation, its role and 
significance in any given context is contingent on the specific character 
and power of  the state and the international political environment.
Civil society organizations in Africa vary considerably in their capacity 
to contribute to democratic consolidation and, in any case, many 
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of  these are neither equipped nor inclined to perform the various 
roles outlined by White. Indeed, the task of  improving the political 
system and making it more democratic is assigned by Diamond (1994) 
to a special category of  ‘civic’ organizations, although a range of  
organizations might be expected to contribute to this process, including 
womens’ groups, business associations and peasant organizations. 
At the same time it is important to recognize that not all organized 
interests will share a common view about the desirability of  democratic 
forms of  politics; indeed, the experience of  post-colonial rule in Africa 
suggests that in some circumstances social élites might perceive the 
reinstallation of  a democratic regime as an opportunity to gain special 
favours from corrupt politicians. Other sections of  civil society are 
likely to feel threatened by the prospect of  a civilian regime which 
commands authority and widespread popular support, especially those 
engaged in illegal or harmful activities such as smuggling and gun-
running. Moreover, there are many groups in African society who have 
no interest in politics or lack the time and resources to enable them 
to play an effective role in consensus-building. On the other hand, 
grassroots activity might act as a constraint on democracy by separating 
people from meaningful political participation at the national level. 
Finally, while the growth of  associational activity and the proliferation 
of  voluntary organizations can reinforce societal institutions they may 
undermine state capacity (Chazan 1992). Despite these qualifications, 
there may exist a particular set of  conditions in which a wide range of  
civil society organizations can take on constitutive and disciplinary roles 
which are supportive of  the process of  democratic consolidation. 
Bratton (1994) has identified three such conditions – material, 
organizational and ideological – which support the emergence of  active 
civil societies in the context of  political transition by giving them a base 
which is independent from that of  the state. Following the classical 
Marxist tradition, material conditions are a function of  the ability of  
groups and individuals to accumulate capital and hence are contingent 
on the growth of  an indigenous bourgeoisie. The political affiliations of  
this class are substantially affected by economic performance and the 
ability of  the government to create the conditions in which independent 
enterprises can prosper. Moreover, the existence of  a middle class is 
often held to be key to the consolidation of  a functioning democracy. 
The organizational realm refers to intermediate associations in civil 
society and the organizational linkages between them; this would 
typically include churches, trade union federations and business 
associations. The scope for these networks to emerge and establish 
an independent base is usually contingent on political and historical 
circumstances; clearly, the ending of  authoritarian rule provides them 
with political space to flourish and develop. Finally, the ideological 
dimension is a function of  the level of  discourse which mobilizes critical 
debate. In Africa, this invariably centres on problems of  economic 
mismanagement and élite corruption, although the rallying cry 
might take the form of  moral condemnation as opposed to popular 
mobilization depending on the organization which assumes the lead 
(Endnotes)
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role in the process of  political transition. But it can also take the form 
of  irredentism and fundamentalist movements which have little interest 
in democracy, as the case of  Algeria convincingly demonstrates, which 
should serve as a reminder of  the contradictory roles played by civil 
society organizations in this regard.
While these three factors are important, access to resources is a critical 
determinant of  the ability of  civic organizations to make an effective 
contribution to democratic consolidation. These take the form of  
financial as well as organizational and ideological resources. The 
resources available to civic organizations emerging from a protracted 
period of  authoritarian rule are usually fairly meagre on account 
of  suppression and limited access to outside information. Many 
organizations are formed during the process of  political liberalization 
and do not have strong social foundations. These will have considerable 
experience of  challenging authoritarian regimes but little knowledge 
of  building democratic government since; mobilizing public opinion 
against authoritarian rule is far easier than active promotion of  
democratic values and political participation. The absence of  a strong 
organizational base can limit the legitimacy they possess and the 
skills base on which they are able to draw. At the same time, while 
insufficient financial resources and limited technical expertise have 
posed problems for civil society organizations, the mobilization of  
funds through membership contributions has proved possible, especially 
for local credit unions and development groups, but also for trade 
unions and professional associations, and can enhance their legitimacy 
and accountability. In this respect Chazan (1992: 290) notes that 
‘associational autonomy is more central to the vitality of  civil societies 
than the availability of  adequate means’. Nevertheless, in situations 
where the ability to mobilize domestic financial resources is highly 
circumscribed, outside support can play a vital role in strengthening 
the capacity of  civic organizations to build and sustain democracy in 
the fragile conditions that many contemporary African societies are 
facing. External support derives principally from official aid donors, 
but historically assistance from political foundations, non-governmental 
organizations, international federations representing business and the 
professions (for example through the Rotarians and the Lions Clubs), 
trade unions, and churches have made a significant contribution. 
Although aid designed to strengthen civil society can be interpreted 
very broadly, the principal focus of  donor efforts in the context of  
democratic consolidation have been on urban-based organizations in 
six main categories: business and professional bodies, trade unions, 
womens’ organizations, human rights groups, religious organizations 
and advocacy-based NGOs.3
3 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AID DONORS
For reasons outlined earlier, strengthening civil society has become 
a major objective of  aid donors in the 1990s, but there are historical 
precedents. The US government, for example, has funded civic 
organizations in developing countries in the past, but not always 
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with the intention of  deepening democracy. A prominent objective 
of  American political aid in the 1950s and 1960s was to counter 
Communist influence in the international trade union movement. 
Much of  this was provided by USAID and channelled through four 
regional labour institutes of  the International Department of  the 
American Federation of  Labor-Congress of  Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) created in the 1960s. US democracy assistance programmes 
were formalized and expanded in the early 1980s and a variety of  
organizations assumed responsibility for publicly funded foreign 
political aid (see Carothers in this volume). The funds allocated for this 
purpose have increased rapidly, from US$93 million in 1990 to some 
$400 million in 1994.
Germany has also long been involved in democracy promotion 
centring on support for political parties, trade unions and civil society 
organizations. The German Stiftüngen (political foundations) aligned 
to the three major political parties, were originally founded for 
internal political education after World War II, but became active in 
international political projects in the 1950s. After the creation of  the 
German ministry for overseas development in 1961, the government 
channelled funds to the foundations for ‘socio-political education’ 
in developing countries. The bulk of  the funds are in the form of  
grants to party-based organizations, but projects to promote trade 
unions, cooperatives and other civil society organizations are also 
important. In 1989, funding from the German development ministry 
to the political foundations amounted to $156 million; a further 
$183 million was provided to German non-governmental organizations 
(Pinto-Duschinsky 1991). 
The British government has since adopted a similar model, but on 
a much smaller scale, in the form of  the Westminster Foundation 
for Democracy, which was established in 1992. Its objectives are to 
build democratic institutions overseas through support for political 
parties, human rights groups, trade unions, journalists’ and lawyers’ 
organizations, womens’ groups, and other civil society organizations. 
Half  the budget is allocated to British political parties to support 
counterparts in other countries, while the remainder is for all-party or 
no-party projects. In 1992/93 the Foundation provided grants totalling 
US$1,400,000 for 140 projects in three priority regions: Central and 
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Anglophone Africa. 
Other bilateral aid donors and private foundations have supported 
similar activities in the past, but not on such a large scale as the 
American and German governments, and through a variety of  
institutional mechanisms.4 Most support trade union development, 
either through domestic trade union federations or through multilateral 
bodies like the ILO and the International Confederation of  Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU). In 1991 support from bilateral agencies for trade 
union development amounted to US$69 million (out of  US$92 million 
from all sources); almost half  of  this went to trade unions in Africa, 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: ‘States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era’ 59–76 | 67
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
for a variety of  projects spanning education, health and safety, and 
capacity building (ICFTU 1993). The Danish government is among 
the larger donors in this area, allocating US$5 million annually to 
the Danish Trade Union Council for International Development 
Co-operation. USAID has assisted in the growth and development of  
business associations in several African countries as part of  an initiative 
to increase the profile of  the private sector. Canada and the Netherlands 
have given positive support to human rights organizations over a 
number of  years, usually with NGOs serving as intermediaries. Another 
important area of  donor intervention is the promotion of  womens’ 
rights, especially in the form of  legal awareness programmes, but also 
through more general capacity building and training programmes for 
womens’ organizations. 
A large proportion of  donor funding for civil society organizations 
is channelled through NGOs, although it is difficult to distinguish 
projects designed to strengthen institutional capacity and promote 
democratic development from those which have more narrowly 
focused development objectives. Examples of  the former are the 
special budget lines created by the European Commission which 
are open to NGOs: in 1992 US$8 million was allocated for human 
rights and democracy initiatives, and a further US$8 million for 
supporting the democratization process in Chile and Central America, 
primarily through Latin American and European NGOs.5 Special 
funds such as these are less common among the bilateral donors (the 
Dutch government is an exception in this regard since it has special 
programmes for human rights, trade unions and the media), although 
a number of  NGO projects funded through conventional co-financing 
mechanisms have similar objectives. For example, most human rights 
work supported by CIDA has been undertaken by NGOs, and funds 
for this have amounted to over US$100 million over the past decade 
(Riddell and Bebbington 1995: 54). 
Some donors concentrate their efforts on fostering a political and 
legislative environment which is conducive to the work of  civil society 
organizations, by ensuring that freedoms of  expression and association 
are enshrined in law, and pressing for changes in the legislative 
framework which govern their activities. A number support civic 
organizations for discrete democracy-building purposes, in the form 
of  election-monitoring, fostering accountability and transparency 
in government, and strengthening democratic political institutions. 
Another approach has been to increase the capacity of  organized 
interest groups to assume a more prominent role in policy dialogue 
and implementation, by improving their research and advocacy skills, 
strengthening their organizational base and providing them with 
equipment and office space. In some cases, increasing the involvement 
of  civic organizations in policy dialogue is designed to broaden the 
consensus behind a particular development strategy, which in much of  
Africa centres on economic liberalization and an enhanced role for the 
private sector.
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4 THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLITICAL AID
Although many donors are rapidly increasing the volume of  foreign 
political aid, the overall objectives of  projects designed to strengthen 
civil society organizations are not always clearly stated. For most 
donors, assisting the growth and development of  such organizations 
is intrinsically a good thing, since it contributes to political pluralism 
and draws more people into associational life. The expectation is that 
a vibrant civil society can facilitate political participation and inculcate 
democratic values by involving marginalized groups and providing 
them with access to those holding positions of  power, although in Africa 
this potential is generally latent rather than proven (Chazan 1992). 
Landell-Mills (1992: 552) identifies four ways in which civil society 
might be nurtured: (1) by facilitating the dissemination of  information; 
(2) by strengthening the rule of  law; (3) by expanding education and the 
capacity for self-expression and (4) by generating surplus resources to 
support associational activities without compromising their autonomy. 
Donor assistance efforts have ranged across all four areas, but in 
practice most support comes in the form of  financial resources and 
technical assistance.
However, since the overall objectives of  foreign political aid are often 
vague and ill-defined, it is difficult to assess the probable impact of  
interventions designed to strengthen civil society with any degree of  
precision. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate what the probable 
effects might be in order to highlight problems that might arise if  
donors persist with a strategy premised on the pluralist notion that 
civil society organizations are working towards a common goal of  
strengthening democracy without a conflict of  interests. This would 
enable one to identify the most appropriate mechanisms for such 
assistance and to avoid interventions which might be counter-productive 
from the point of  view of  democratic consolidation or damaging in 
other respects.
The four categories outlined by White (1994) provide a framework 
through which these questions can be addressed. The first centres on 
altering the balance of  power between the state and society in favour 
of  the latter through the creation of  a dense network of  civil society 
organizations. The availability of  foreign aid can provide a powerful 
stimulus for new organizations to be formed, and can assist in increasing 
the size and membership of  existing organizations. Whether this type 
of  external assistance can contribute to democratic consolidation by 
increasing the scope for political participation is a function of  the types 
of  groups receiving external assistance, the nature of  their membership 
and the degree of  popular legitimacy. Simply encouraging the 
formation of  new groups and organizations may generate little visible 
return unless the assistance is directed towards organizations which have 
clear objectives and real potential to advance the democracy agenda. In 
this respect Chazan (1992: 303) cautions that ‘while the voluntary sector 
has helped to undermine statism and to provide a political opening 
for specific interests and norms, it has yet to establish institutional 
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foundations and normative principles essential to the consolidation of  
civil society and hence democracy.’
The dangers inherent in indiscriminate funding of  civil society 
organizations to promote political pluralism are in some ways rather 
obvious. Different donors may encourage the formation of  organizations 
which are seeking to root themselves in a similar constituency, or 
support organizations which have conflicting objectives (for example 
business associations versus trade unions). There is also a danger that 
the availability of  external aid might attract unscrupulous organizations 
possessing agendas which are antithetical to democracy, either because 
their leaders are intent on using the organization as a means of  
furthering personal political objectives, or because the organization in 
question has goals which serve to undermine political consensus and 
generate social conflict. 
These problems can be mitigated or avoided if  donors are willing 
to coordinate their actions, possibly by focusing their assistance 
programmes on organizations with which they have a particular affinity 
or for which relevant expertise is available within their own country. 
They also focus attention on the importance of  rigorous appraisal 
and informed local knowledge in preference to the rather ad hoc 
procedures utilized by most donors in which aid or diplomatic staff try 
to spot eligible organizations or filter unsolicited requests in a more 
reactive mode. This underlines the need for building capacity in donor 
organizations which may not possess the staff resources or operational 
structure to enable them to adopt such procedures.6
The second category concerns the disciplinary function performed by 
civil society organizations to ensure that the state is operating along 
democratic principles. This takes several forms: the introduction and 
enforcement of  mechanisms for holding politicians or public officials 
accountable for their actions; the protection and extension of  civil and 
political rights; and monitoring state behaviour in relation to human 
rights. These functions can only be performed by a fairly narrow 
range of  civic organizations with specialist skills, such as lawyers’ and 
journalists’ associations, and civil rights groups. The main problem here 
might be that of  too much money being made available to relatively 
few capable organizations, which could encourage the formation of  
rival associations, or detract existing organizations from their primary 
objectives. Heavy reliance on donor funding might also undermine 
their wider legitimacy and inhibit their sustainability. Landell-Mills 
(1992: 554) notes in this regard: 
External funding should always take the form of  supplementary 
assistance and ought never to be the main source of  what is needed. 
Members are easy to attract when given access to free resources, 
but if  outside grants become absolutely indispensable, then the 
sustainability of  the organization or institution becomes highly 
questionable.
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Another problem relates to the limited political agendas of  these 
organizations, especially those representing lawyers, which might 
ultimately be more interested in pursuing the narrow self-interests 
of  their members from the point of  view of  widening opportunities 
for monetary gain and enhanced status than democratic goals 
per se. Moreover, as Chazan has observed, some of  the urban-based 
middle-class groups which assumed a prominent role in movements 
campaigning for the restoration of  democratic rule were active in 
supporting authoritarian rule in the past (Chazan 1992: 303). These 
problems point to the need to establish channels for facilitating dialogue 
between donors and potential recipients to identify joint priorities and 
to enable donors to respond to requests for assistance in line with these 
priorities rather than with donor-driven policy objectives requiring 
quick and demonstrable results which could result in inappropriate 
funding decisions.
The third category of  intervention lies in the intermediary role 
performed by civic organizations between the state and society by 
transmitting and articulating interest group demands. In this capacity 
civil society organizations seek to promote greater consultation and 
popular involvement in the process of  policy formulation, especially 
by disadvantaged groups which have traditionally been denied access 
to political power. It also embraces more activist forms of  engagement 
with the state, where civic organizations employ a variety of  means 
to provide their constituents with greater ‘voice’ in order to influence 
state officials and policy decisions. These can range from advocacy 
efforts centred on the media and political lobbying through to more 
confrontational approaches involving demonstrations and other forms 
of  non-violent protest. 
Donors have placed particular emphasis on improving the scope for 
participation by marginalized social groups in the public policy process. 
At the level of  development projects this takes the form of  popular 
participation in decision making and policy implementation and NGOs 
are seen to play an important role in this regard. This concern extends 
to policy dialogue on the national plane and donors have sought to 
enhance the capacity of  organized interest groups for research and 
policy analysis to enable them to make more effective interventions 
in the policy process. Democratization presents new opportunities for 
interest groups to gain access to state policy makers and public officials, 
in order to present their particular viewpoint on policy decisions 
which are likely to affect their members. Donor assistance in the form 
of  training, technical assistance and equipment is complemented 
by helping governments set up forums through which formal policy 
dialogue can take place. 
One problem with these types of  interventions is that relatively 
small amounts of  foreign funding can have a considerable impact on 
organizational capacity, and create an imbalance in the power and 
resources available to different organizations. For example, the proclivity 
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of  the United States to support business associations is in line with its 
policy stance of  promoting free enterprise and a higher level of  support 
to such organizations can give them privileged access to policy makers 
and heightened visibility in public policy arenas. This can give rise to 
special pleading on the part of  sectional business interests in favour of  
policies which are of  immediate short-term benefit to their members 
but potentially harmful to others. 
Second, strengthening the capacity of  private sector lobby groups and 
other influential civic organizations for policy dialogue often carries 
with it an implicit ideological agenda. Efforts to involve more organized 
interests in the policy process are frequently directed towards creating 
a more active consensus in favour of  economic reform, by giving the 
potential beneficiaries of  reform a greater stake in policy outcomes, 
but also by mitigating potential opposition from the losers of  reform, 
or at least channelling active opposition into passive acceptance. This 
is obviously desirable from the point of  view of  the proponents and 
funders of  structural adjustment programmes since it increases the 
likelihood of  political sustainability, but it might squeeze out room 
for alternative perspectives and feedback on the adverse impact of  
economic reform unless provision is made for this. It might also 
conflict with the ambitions of  other donors to promote a redistributive 
agenda centred on increasing the access of  the poor and politically 
disenfranchised groups to the policy process. Hence, groups which resist 
or criticize the policy agenda of  the government might find themselves 
marginalized or deliberately sidelined as a result of  a desire among 
donors to strengthen supporters of  the prevailing agenda. 
A third problem is the possibility of  overloading the capacity of  
government policy-makers to accommodate interest group pressure 
without damaging the technical consistency of  policy initiatives. Most 
policy makers in adjusting economies in Africa are already under 
serious pressure of  work and those concerned with economic policy 
spend a considerable amount of  time attending to donor requirements 
and policy conditions; they are often not in a position to respond 
sympathetically even if  they are well disposed to increased policy 
dialogue. A more serious prospect is that of  gridlock where sustained 
interest group pressure fosters inertia and undermines the capacity of  
the government to pursue a sustained development strategy (Migdal 
1988). This is unlikely in most African contexts since organized interests 
are neither sufficiently well organized or numerous to pose a serious 
threat to state policy making capacity, but it does highlight the need to 
create some degree of  insulation for key policy makers balanced by the 
creation of  formal channels for policy dialogue.
The fourth category of  donor intervention concerns the constitutive 
role performed by civil society organizations, which takes a number 
of  different forms: increasing the legitimacy of  the political system by 
instilling and upholding democratic values through civic education 
programmes; providing people with experience of  participating 
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in democratic debate within these organizations; and in recruiting 
and training new political leaders. This is a less contentious area for 
donor intervention, since these types of  activities have been a historic 
function of  civic organizations in democratic societies. Many donors 
are supporting civic education programmes, voter registration drives 
and election monitoring. Such interventions have helped to ensure that 
elections have been reasonably free and fair, but the longer term impact 
of  civic education programmes are more difficult to assess. The problem 
might come with indiscriminate funding of  organizations which do not 
have a strong base of  legitimacy or developed membership, or which do 
not possess the technical skills and technical expertise to enable them 
to carry out such functions. Some groups might be formed in response 
to the availability of  donor funding and to further individual political 
agendas which again highlights the importance of  careful appraisal 
and the need for a thorough understanding of  the composition of  civil 
society in the countries in question.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Many of  the problems identified in the previous section are latent 
and there is as yet insufficient documented evidence to provide 
a clear picture on the impact of  donor interventions designed to 
strengthen civil society organizations. Some of  these problems have 
been encountered by donors in directly funding development NGOs, 
especially those concerning a possible erosion of  independence and 
autonomy, and there may be lessons which are of  relevance here 
(Riddell and Bebbington 1995).
There are, of  course, positive reasons why supporting civil society 
organizations is a laudable objective for aid donors, if  they are able 
to make a more effective contribution to the process of  democratic 
consolidation as a result of  external assistance. But there are also a 
number of  caveats. These fall into two groups: following on from the 
previous section, there are a series of  operational concerns relating to 
the funding relationship, but there are also a set of  more fundamental 
questions stemming from the premises on which donor interventions in 
this area are founded. 
As was argued earlier, most donors adhere to a definition of  civil 
society steeped in the liberal political tradition which holds that civic 
associations occupy a public domain located between the family and 
the state, in which there is a shared consensus on democratic norms 
and respect for political pluralism. This approach tends to obscure 
conflicts between different categories of  civic associations and fails 
to give adequate recognition to the existence of  divisive social forces 
which are averse to democracy, but nevertheless form part of  ‘civil’ 
society. Hence interventions founded on the notion that merely 
altering the balance between the state and civil society in favour of  
the latter in some quantitative sense will contribute to democratic 
consolidation, overlook potentially destructive elements in civil society 
which make such interventions both difficult and hazardous. One 
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might therefore conclude that most donors, as presently constituted, 
are poorly-equipped to intervene directly without either exacerbating 
such tendencies or creating imbalances of  power between different 
organizations. But this ignores the fact that most donors have already 
embarked on this path, and that some have amassed considerable 
experience. Given this scenario, there are a series of  operational issues 
that merit attention, which can help to ensure that donors proceed 
cautiously with modest expectations of  what might be achieved in view 
of  the limitations and potential problems sketched out earlier.
First, many of  the organizations that donors would like to support are 
small and fairly new. Large quantities of  aid resources in relation to 
their actual requirements could swamp these organizations before they 
are in a position to map out their objectives, build up an independent 
membership and gain wider legitimacy. At the same time aid 
interventions directed towards civil society strengthening are unlikely 
to be very substantial, either in terms of  the size of  projects funded or 
in terms of  their share of  official development assistance, and pressure 
on donors to allocate increased levels of  resources to meet overall good 
government policy objectives may induce recipient organizations to 
accept more funds than they require. Donor coordination is clearly 
essential when the supply of  funding exceeds the requirements of  
recipient organizations in order to avoid a situation where there is 
competition for the more attractive counterparts or where unscrupulous 
organizations can gain access to these funds. 
Second, it takes time for these activities to bear fruit, and the 
development of  a mature and robust set of  civil society organizations 
that are able to perform the various roles set out above can be an 
extremely protracted process. External funding can assist in this process 
and perhaps give it a boost, but it would be folly to presume that civil 
societies can be artificially induced when the material, organizational 
and ideological conditions prevailing in many African countries 
undergoing political transition are not conducive to the rapid growth 
of  civil society. The availability of  material resources is certainly 
important, but it may not be central to building up a robust civil society, 
since in situations where associational life has long been suppressed, 
building organizational capacity and developing a distinctive ideological 
stance are essential prerequisites for enabling civil society organizations 
to contribute effectively to the process of  democratic consolidation. 
Third, it is difficult to assess the contribution made by civil society 
organizations given the absence of  an established framework for 
evaluation. By their very nature, many organizations may not have 
developed internal procedures for documenting their work or assessing 
their impact. Insistence by donors on rigorous monitoring procedures 
could lead to the imposition of  inappropriate practices which might 
divert energy away from the main goals of  the organization and 
undermine its effectiveness. At the same time it will be necessary for 
donors to account for the use of  these funds, and evaluation can in 
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turn induce greater accountability from recipient organizations, but 
this should not be at the expense of  internal accountability to their 
members.
This last caveat raises the question of  the most appropriate mechanism 
for channelling funds and other resources to civil society organizations. 
Donors employ a variety of  mechanisms for this purpose, ranging from 
using intermediaries such as NGOs and political foundations, through 
to direct funding from overseas mission funds. NGOs are a tried and 
tested intermediary for working with local membership organizations 
and advocacy groups, but have less experience in civic and political 
education, and in supporting specialized interest groups such as trade 
unions and business associations. Political foundations often have this 
type of  expertise, but they have the disadvantage of  being perceived 
as partisan or as a potential threat by state authorities. Donors usually 
channel trade union funding through domestic trade union bodies which 
have the links and the expertise but which often lack an in-country 
presence. Using mission funds to provide support in response to locally 
generated requests is favoured by some donors but has its limitations, 
especially if  there is not good donor coordination. These various 
mechanisms will continue to be used by donors, but there are other 
mechanisms and approaches which have not been explored and which 
could help to obviate some of  the potential problems highlighted earlier. 
For example, it may be more productive for donors to specialize in 
certain categories of  organization with whom they have a certain 
familiarity or which have a particular expertise. Linking up or twinning 
domestic organizations with counterparts in developing countries, or 
between organizations from the same region is a good route to follow 
since there is much relevant experience that can be shared and they 
have skills which donors do not possess. Creating forums through which 
recipient organizations can exert some degree of  influence over the 
terms on which the support is provided can increase the legitimacy of  
external funding and ensure that it corresponds to locally defined needs. 
On balance, while democracy promotion may be a laudable objective in 
its own right, there are a number of  potential pitfalls confronting donors 
who are seeking to expand political aid programmes. Some indication 
of  the sorts of  problems that might arise has been given along with 
suggestions about action that could be taken to mitigate these. Although 
positive support for strengthening civil society organizations has many 
advantages over political conditionality as a means of  advancing good 
government objectives, donors will need to be realistic about the volume 
of  assistance that can channelled through this mechanism since civil 
society organizations cannot absorb large quantities of  funding and 
it takes time for the results to become apparent. Donor efforts in this 
field will therefore need to proceed in a cautious and in well-informed 
manner in order to avoid forcing the agenda at a pace that would 
run counter to the twin objectives of  democratic consolidation and 
promoting a pluralistic political culture in developing countries.
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NOTES
1 Important exceptions were Bayart (1986) and various essays in 
Rothchild and Chazan (1988). 
2 For a comprehensive review see Keane (1988) and Bobbio (1988).
3 NGOs represent only one category within the panoply of  
organizations supported by donors for furthering democratic 
goals, and it is primarily advocacy-based organizations rather than 
development NGOs engaged in service delivery which perform this 
role. It is also doubtful whether NGOs actually form part of  civil 
society, since they are generally function as intermediaries between 
donors and civil society organizations, as conduits of  resources and 
information. See Frantz (1987) and Fowler (1991).
4 The Ford Foundation has played a very important role in this regard, 
having provided grants to a range of  civil society organizations in 
developing countries over a number of  years.
5 In 1992 a new budget line of  US$0.8 million was established to 
support local authorities, trade unions and grassroots organizations, 
but this is small in comparison with other budget lines open to NGOs. 
6 Riddell and Bebbington (1995: 53) make a similar point in the 
context of  donor funding for southern NGOs, in arguing that 
effective support ‘requires local knowledge and an in-country 
presence over an extended period’.
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